![]() But distributing that key in every service is a security risk: if someone gets access to this key, they can create a token with any authorization level they want. If you know the initial secret key, you can reconstruct the entire chain and verify that you obtain the same initial signature. Macaroons use a design based on chaining HMAC calculations: start from the initial secret, sign the first caveat, then for each new caveat, sign it using the previous signature as key. Unfortunately, Macaroon validation requires knowing the secret key used to generate the initial token. With Macaroons, a service can attenuate the token before sending it to the next service, by adding a caveat, a condition over the current request (expiration date, limiting to read operations, restricting file paths to a prefix…). Also, we need to make sure the authorization policies are evaluated in the same way in all services. ![]() But then, any service holding that token has the entire set of rights for that request. With JWT, you could generate a temporary token in the user-facing API, and carry that from service to service. The microservices case is tricky: the initial request may come from a user for which we can look up a list of rights, but some services in the request tree may not even have a concept of user: at Clever Cloud, the service that launches virtual machines never hears about who requested a new deployment. Roles and groups) with a client's organization chart? How do you reconcile an application's authorization policies (often some basic.Request, as it goes from service to service? In a microservices system, how do you handle authorization from an initial.When we started working on Biscuit, we were battling common issues in modern web applications: it comes with a powerful logic language to write authorization policies, like OPA, but those policies can also be carried by the tokenīy assembling those techniques, it opens up an array of authorization patterns that were not possible before.it can be signed with public key or secret key cryptography like JWT.Language used to encode authorization policiesīiscuit unifies these various approaches: Open Policy Agent is a server-side logic.It is also an Italian almond or coconut-based cake (do not confuse it with the French macaron which is also an almond They support attenuation: the holder of a token canĬreate a new valid token by adding a caveat, further restricting the token. Signed (HMAC) tokens focused on authorization. They can even be encrypted, and stored in a cookie, but they cannot be Secret key cryptography (HMAC algorithm), or public key cryptography (RSA,ĮCDSA). Modified, a web application could store session data in a JWT and send it inĪ cookie, and read it from HTTP requests. Since the signature guarantees it has not been They're good with lots of chocolate chips.Ĭryptographically signed data. (the session data is then in a database, indexed by those identifiers), orĪuthentication tokens. Cookies are a storage area in browsers, which can contain a session identifier.Where does it fit in the current authentication projects landscape (and why all of those cake themed names)? After 2 years of development, I am proud to share with you the official release of Biscuit, the authentication and authorization token we develop to manage access to our systems.
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